Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 12

Number 4

Article 8

2006

Session Four; Development and the Judicial Process
Dale B. Furnish

Recommended Citation
Dale B. Furnish, Session Four; Development and the Judicial Process, 12 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 483 (2006)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol12/iss4/8

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Law and Business Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU
Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

SESSION FOUR: DEVELOPMENT AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS
PROFESSOR DALE B. FURNISH

I

think it is important to remember that in trade and in law, as in life,
the only constants are growth and change. So for those of you who
are students here, bless your hearts, you are entering a professional
lifetime in which 20 or 30 years from now things will not be as they are
today. They will be different and hopefully they will better. But, also, I
think it is very important to remember, as we see difficulties with these
things, that the closer people get together, our nations get together, the
more friction there will be. I have lived long enough to be wrong a lot of
the time. I remember when Canada and the United States, in 1988, put
together a free trade agreement and one of the first comments that was
made by President Ronald Reagan was, in response to some reporter's
question, "Well, so relations will be better, they will be smoother between
the U.S. and Canada?" And he responded, "Absolutely not, we are
closer but there will be a little more friction. There will be a forum for a
lot of political problems and discussion." I think he has been absolutely
right.
I see these free trade agreements and the integration of systems as a
marriage. In a marriage, you say, "Well who have you got problems
with?" Your wife and children. Right, and if you just have a friend, you
have a possibility [of friction]. That has been history, first with Canada
and now with NAFTA-with Canada, the United States, and Mexico.
The frictions, disputes, and controversies have gone up exponentially. I
would also give perhaps a look at what might or might not help. I am
complying with this industry. I am always trying to say, "Look at the
United States as a common market and look at the procedure that this
couple of centuries took to get there and some of the strife and the controversy that we had to work out. Look at the European Union." It has
been a curse within my lifetime. It has not been smooth and it is still not
smooth. But look at the progress from the coal and steel community to
the European Union of today. It has certainly changed. It has certainly
grown and it will continue to change and grow.
Now, in terms of trying to tie what I want to talk about to what other
people have talked about today, I really want to talk about folks and how
they make decisions. The way they resolve disputes and controversies
and the way they benchmark that with published opinion. Again, I have
been around long enough to have gotten some impressions that may or
may not be right but they are strongly held opinions. One opinion is that
countries can change habits when habits become painful enough and as-
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sociated with enough trauma that there is some sort of break and they
move on. Now, I have been wrong again. For example, I thought Chili
would never change. I spent a year in Chili and I became familiar with
Chili's socialist laws. I think that given enough trauma, Chili has
changed. Another country that I cite in this regard is El Salvador which
had a terrible civil war. I had to actually negotiate an interim peace support in 1994. At least as I travel through Central America, many people
may think Costa Rica to be the most advanced society. I think El Salvador is. I attribute some of that to coming out of the Civil War. It was so
traumatic. It really opened the country up to change.
I want to focus here on Mexico this afternoon very briefly, but I would
at least propose the possibility to you that Mexico has had a terrible time.
The 1990s in Mexico were a time of economic disaster. You live close to
the border in Texas, but at least what I found in Arizona was that a lot of
people are not aware of what is going on in Mexico. I continually tell
them that it is the 1930s. This is a terrible economic time. The Mexican
society is really decimated by what is going on economically. I think that
was true in that it was a time of an assassination of a presidential candidate in Mexico. There was a time when there was sea change in the political system. A true democracy began to open up. It was a time when
NAFTA came in. So it was a time of tremendous trauma in the national
life of Mexico in the 1990s, and yet I am very optimistic about the
changes that are going on in Mexico right now. I think free trade is part
of that, and I will just very quickly try to point out some specifics. There
are several general examples and a specific example with the courts. You,
and particularly the young students in the room, will live to see me
proven right or wrong. But I truly do believe there is much going on
under the radar in Mexico.
There are changes taking place in the roots of the system that have not
produced flowers above ground yet but they will. They are taking root
and they will have long term effect. I can mention 1,000 but let me mention just one or two or three or four or five. Mexico has a new bankruptcy law. This is interesting because in the 1990s they had no
bankruptcy law. It was frustrating among other things because of the little group called Batisone. It consisted of citizens that would go to courts
and as all courts dealt with bankruptcy, they would visit a judge. They
would say, "We are having foreclosure on Roberto MacLean's house.
Roberto is a good guy. He has got a nice family. We do not want you to
take his house. Why do not you just not do that?" And the judges would
not do that. Now I do not know if that was an oral threat or what went
on, but that was the bankruptcy law in the time of great economic distress
in Mexico and they were able to frustrate it through the Batisone. Now
they have reconstituted the bankruptcy law. They put it into the federal
court. There is an incipient bankruptcy law growing in the federal district
where many of the major companies are incorporated. So you are beginning to get a Chapter 11-like reorganization practiced in each federal dis-
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trict. It is really changing, but it is just incipient. Look back in twenty
years. But remember the history of American bankruptcy law coming
out of WWII. It has really changed.
Competition policy-it is an institution-building proposition. Before
NAFTA there was no competition policy. There was a law but it was not
enforced. Neither did the Federal Competition Commission in Mexico,
and it is beginning to take off. I think if you ask most people in Mexico
about the Federal Competition Commission you would get a blank stare.
But is it beginning to start? Sure. It is beginning to take effect and it will
continue.
The court in Mexico really changed when Ernesto Zedillo, elected
President in 1994, set out to change the courts and he did. I will give you
one example that I observed. The judiciary in the federal district I think
was shameful. There were some world class lawyers-a lot of world class
lawyers, but the courts were crummy. The explanation is pretty simple.
The economy has changed that and I think twelve years later, if you
spend time in the federal district in Mexico City with the federal district
judiciary, you will be impressed. Those are good, good lawyers. A lot of
it is simple economics. They are finally paying a living wage. The good
lawyers are dedicated. A lot of the corruption is going away and they
have had a real effect, but they will have a larger effect as the years go by.
Just really quickly I want to talk about one example. Again, out of the
1990s there was a procedure under Section 341 of the Commercial Code
which allowed summary debt collection in Mexico. It was a three-day
procedure. A creditor could go to the debtor and say, "You owe me
money and you have not paid it. I am going to foreclose on my guarantee
and all the response you can have is to prove you paid the debt or ante up
the money that you owe on the debt." Otherwise you foreclose. That
procedure had been held unconstitutional on two occasions before 1990,
but it takes five consecutive decisions in Mexico to create what is called
jurisprudence or a rule of law. As the 1990s started, and people used the
Section 341 procedure, twice more it was taken to the Mexican Supreme
Court and they decided it was unconstitutional. So on the very doorstep
of creating five consecutive decisions and creating jurisprudencia, a binding rule in Mexico, they ran into a mere judicial system. One of the interesting things about the first decisions is they were textually the same. But
after the first decision, the next three decisions simply copied virtually
word for word the first decision.
PROFESSOR ALEJANDRO GARRO
There are very well-defined driving forces for judicial reform efforts.
One is strengthening the process of transition to democracy and democratic consolidations either in countries of the former Soviet Union or in
countries of Latin America, Asia, or Africa which struggle with problems
of underdevelopment. In that sense, much of the driving force of law
reform has been either sometimes in constitution making, sometimes in
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trying to find effective enforcement of a bill of rights, more effective
mechanisms to judicial review, and then also widespread going into areas
of electoral systems, party systems, development of society groups, etc.
Then in addition to that driving force, there is a need to actually
strengthen the sense of security and productability, for that is something
without which no market economy can be built. And in that sense the
focus has been in areas such as torts, contracts, property, and dispute resolution-without which it is impossible to have a reliable system of solving disputes. Finally, I think another connected driving force in law
reform efforts is the significance of trade and foreign investment, because
the driving force is actually behind much of the forces behind organization and unification of commercial law. Now with the idea that if we are
going to be doing business globally, you need to understand what the
recipient host country is about. And for that it is a good idea that someone would make a law that everybody can understand and probably publish and understand in more than one language.
I think that there are quite a number of important reasons for actually
being engaged in law reform efforts. I think that law reform efforts, looking backwards, that started in the early 1990s have been quite disappointing in many ways. Of course, there are many reasons why law
reform is worthwhile, possible, and worth undertaking. But there are not
so many success stories. In fact, many comments have been written in a
prolific number of papers in academia that have been very critical about
this rule of low promotion programs, finding them of questionable value
and finding that they had little lasting impact in the societies where they
were to be done.
I was wondering if we look back, where we realize that these changes
are promoted by the international financial institutions, by the United
States government, Canadian government, and German government,
they actually are changes that are going to take generations to take it
through. However, it is important, at this time, to reflect upon what are
the barriers for a more successful law reform or judicial reform effort. I
think that legal culture is one significant element to take into account.
Something that, actually, I learned for the first time again in reflecting
upon legal culture in an essay written by Professor MacLean, dated 1996,
in Washington where he proposed what he called a culture of service as
opposed to a culture of authorities, speaking of the administration of justice. I think that article made an impression on me because, even though
written by someone who has experience as a judge, a public servant, and
at the time a legal advisor of the World Bank, it is something that he was
able to bring out from inside someone who actually knew very well more
than one legal culture. I understand that the word culture may raise
some concerns because somehow it has become very easy to fall into stereotypes, ridicule, and things of that nature. But I think that there is a
bottom line well-taken in different legal cultures in the world. And we
should take them seriously because no legal norm operates in a vacuum,

2006]

SESSION FOUR

but against a background of that legal culture. And in the same way that
we can say that there is Asian legal culture that is more prone to conciliation and mediation rather than litigation, or there is an American legal
culture that could maybe be more pragmatic than other legal cultures,
even though there may be only half truth and maybe much is stereotype,
on that there is a part of truth. I think that is something significant in the
process of law. We need to take that into account, realizing that that
would be a poor legal cultural working definition and an impressionistic
view of legal culture that actually fits every aspect of the law-shaping,
law-applying, law-interpreting, and law-enforcing.
If you think about areas of law shaping the law, the adoptions of law
for all the world is a history of borrowings from legal rule of law that
worked relatively well in one country, that is actually looked upon by
other countries as a Latino rule of law. And therefore the shaping of the
law is very much influenced by legal culture, because whatever that rule
of law says is actually what the legal culture in that recipient country
would want that rule to say.
Then there is the question of interpretation of the law. In that article,
Professor MacLean also confronted the different approaches of the judge
to be more formalistic, tied up to the language of the law that looks at the
meaning of every word of the statute, as opposed to those judges who,
within the parameters of the law, make use of some leeway of discretion,
being able to reach what is a sensible solution. And that legal culture
plays a role because there are legal traditions brought up in the idea of
judges are the masters of the law, as opposed to legal systems where the
judges are given much more wide discretion, expressly so.
In the area of enforcement of the law, that is where law makers probably see that there are actual differences between the law reform that is
taught, and what the actual practice is. You see the same law in the
books, in the same constitution, and in the same statutes applied so differently according to the legal culture of that country. Therefore, I think
there is something to be said in favor of that legal culture in the five
minutes that I have remaining.
I will simply differentiate between the impact of that legal culture in
the administration of justice, which I would say judicial reform efforts, as
opposed to the legal cultures impact or influence in law reform efforts. I
do not think we should differentiate between the two because law reform
agents are actually devoting their efforts not only in the enactment of
laws that probably are going to be working well, but they also realize they
need to have good administrators of the law. And then the division of
justice issue obviously involves and implicates various different types of
issues, but I think that what is interesting to see is that unless that law is
administered, interpreted, and enforced in the way that the lawmaker
wanted, then we see that the system adopts its own reaction and adopts
its own system.
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With the help of all the lawyers, I started to look at what the informal
system does in fact. I realized for the first time that the official judges
and lawyers are in one side of country, but much of the marginal population has its own system of dispute settling. That is when I realized that
obviously it is true that the judiciary does not have the monopoly of settling disputes, but there are so many other different ways of settling disputes, and that if the formal legal system does not provide a suitable
system to settle disputes, there are going to be other new ones developing
on their own. An international litigation and dispute resolution office is a
very good example. Did you realize in the basic areas of the law such as
contracts, torts, and property, you find that probably only in the area of
real estate property do local courts have the final say about who owns
Blackacre and what type of secured interest is there? But in the rest of
the areas of the law, let us say a case of contracts, it is international commercial arbitration that actually is taking over for the most significant
contracts. International bilateral agreements already promote exit arbitration as a proven system of dispute resolution. As you move from contract to areas of tort you will find an arbitration is obviously not a system
of resolution. You have litigation, yet most plaintiffs harmed in developing countries by multinational corporations generally will seek to file suit
before the court with jurisdiction over the place where the defendant is
headquartered, which happens to be the United States. Therefore, you
have a lot of international public litigation moving from the places where
the wrongful act took place to the places where the defendant has its
home base, which of course gives jurisdiction to the courts of that place.
Yet, it is a doctrine of Scottish origin which is very much used, and perhaps abused, by United States courts, by which the former convenien defends will tend to dismiss those cases and move them back to the country
where the death or the loss of limb of the worker may be worth $200-$300
or $1,000, rather than having it in Texas for thousands of dollars. Therefore, you find also that international litigation moves from one area of the
country to another area. Why? Because the dispute resolution mechanism in the country did not provide the type of redress that the plaintiffs
are seeking.
Finally, of course, not to speak about international criminal cases or
where we need to have a court now that if the country does not move in
actually prosecuting certain extremely serious crimes, there is a court now
established that will take care of those issues. Fine, but what if the defendant happens to be not an international criminal but a state that has violated the dignity of human beings both in Strasburg and in Costa Rica?
You also have international tribunals that will take over the job that the
domestic courts do not. Therefore, what I see is a phenomenon of displacing the dispute from the places where the wrongs take place to some
other tribunals, if they are in a foreign country or international tribunal
because the domestic courts are not doing their job. Therefore, the significant consideration is to actually improve the systems of the penal solution, taking into account obviously those legal transplants.
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I just wanted to bring up a few reflections on this phenomenon of law
reform trying to do what seems so extremely difficult to do at the local
front. The first place is that I think we need to realize and recognize that
every law reform effort has a political agenda. And we need to recognize
that there are no innocent, naive rules of law, and we need to decode
what are the values that we are trying to establish. And then that being
the first step, we need to really talk about the values. If it is creditor
protection, because of the bankruptcy system that we are doing, we need
to talk about that openly. And if the act or values that we are seeking to
obtain are just speedy informers of debt money, debts, or whatever, we
really need to do that very clearly. The second step, and I think that it is
important and extremely challenging, is that in many developing countries the settlement of the dispute is not done through law. So one of the
more basic and challenging efforts of law reformers is to realize that if we
want that law to stick, we have to make sure that in that country people
actually take the law seriously; otherwise it will not work. That is an extremely difficult issue connected with a legal culture. And finally, I think
that then we can talk about the contents of the law, and after we are done
discussing the contents of the law, we can spend a lot of time doing research activities, training people who are going to be using that law, and
actually we can probably start that in law school.
DR. DIEGO CESAR BUNGE
I work in that area from the private sector standpoint, and if you look
at the normal evaluations of political risk existing in any developing country, you will not see a factor of the predictability of the actual judicial
system. That is because those measurements of political risk are mostly
addressed at the degree of probability of repaying in due time and manner the sovereign debt of that given country. But if you look at the same
political risk formulas, but for instance transparency international, you
will find a completely different perspective. Definitely a rational investor
or trader that has to make the decision to do business on a long-term
basis in any given jurisdiction will evaluate the level of predictability, the
level of professional response of judiciary of that country.
Getting a little beyond the surface, you have to look at certain organizational factors in order to evaluate the service of justice. First the institutional set-up of that given jurisdiction and by talking about jurisdiction
I am talking about any sovereign state. I am an Argentine lawyer. I practice in Argentina where I do a lot of cross border transactions. But my
country is a federal country also, and the levels of predictability of the
official or formal court system from the different provincial jurisdictions
and municipal jurisdictions are very different. The level of risk is quite
different, and that impacts on its decisions. But also, you have to look
upon how the institutional and legal framework influences the set up of
the jurisdiction. Argentina, for instance, is a hybrid legal system in the
sense that it has numerous constitutions after the constitution. Most con-
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stitutional cases cite U.S. precedent, a similar country which has superimposed many other sorts of regulatory and basic legal legislation that come
from different sources that necessarily creates transaction costs. But also
you have to look at the human resources, not only judges, but also the
members of the judiciary. How are they trained, selected, and paid? How
are they removed? Finally, the court and case docket management issues:
We can see that in the Argentine experience that has been analyzed, in
that when you look at justice as a service then dubitable logistical implications stand. You have to measure the judicial productivity as an outcome that derives from inputs, and then you have to analyze the role of
statistics of that productivity, how reliable those statistics are, the official
ones or if you have to conduct your own field work in order to have
reliable statistics. Then that relates to the analysis of the real workload of
the judicial system. And then you can look into the rate of resolution of
the cases, the rate of delay, the rate of quo congestion, and the rate of
pending cases. This has been done in Argentina through many NGOs,
and the results are available to the domestic and to the international community to work. Many of these NGOs are working hand in hand with the
government, and, at least politically, have recognized the need for judicial
reform. Now these NGOs are also ranking the level of productivity on
the performance of the courts. Ranking means giving awards, and there
are some courts that are not given those awards. That means reactions,
some reactions similar to the ones Roberto faced in Peru. Many of these
NGOs are not welcome to several sectors of the judiciary.
Two important points. These studies look at the court centerary unit
with a responsibility to manage the process. And you have to analyze this
similar unit and see the efficiency in that unit in order to see if different
processes have to be adopted or not. Another new development in the
studies conducted in Argentina is that they may very well be adapted in
the handling of the cases and the dockets simply by adopting the new
tools of the information society. All reforms in all developing nations
have mostly touched tangentially the judicial process, as such, incorporating IT developments, but leaving the main raw material as it was at the
beginning of the twentieth century. That can be transformed very easily,
and has happened in other services, telecommunications, broadcasting,
and most services. There could be leap frog advantages by adopting these
developments.
The processes of selection, monitoring incurring of judges and judiciary
personnel is crucial, and in this regard the importance of having a school
official, a school of the judiciary, work where pledges are formed and
judicial personnel are formed is also crucial in order to make more professional the rendering of the servant.
Another angle to this, in order to finish is that you not only have to
measure in a quantitative manner, but also evening a qualitative manner
the process of a judicial service. You have to measure the quality of the
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law being actually rendered. That relates to the predictability of the
system.
The last item is the very immediate access to transparent reliable case
reporting systems. Argentina started at the end of the nineteenth century
adopting a very reliable case reporting system through private companies,
that actually exported service as a very profitable business to Spain, and
they are doing much better in Spain than in Argentina right now. But
this has to do with the quality of legal education, particularly what is
something that is assumed to be a given here in the United States. Legal
research and writing and advanced legal research and writing. That is
crucial for having good legal analysis and good quality of decisions.
Finally, the role of precedent. I have to disagree with the fact that you
cannot desire principles from continental civil law systems. Actually,
even statistically, that is something to be looked upon in order to see
what to expect from that system. In today's mobilized world it omits
most sovereign nations, I stress the notion of sovereign nations that have
incorporated international human rights treaties into the domestic legal
system. Necessarily the judges have to apply international law in which
the handling of cases and the handling of precedent is vital. The lack of a
system of sterile devices or equivalent is something that does not do
much good to predictability and to the rule of law.
PROFESSOR JENIA TURNER
It is a real honor to be part of this colloquium among so many people
who have thought in great depth about the relationship between the role
of law and economic development and the relationship between the role
of law and human rights and economic development. With that being
said, that relationship raises various broad and complex issues. Today, I
would like to focus on one particular aspect of it, and that is the perceived
tension between, on the one hand, post-conflict justice, prosecutions of
human rights abuses committed during conflict, and, on the other hand,
economic redevelopment post-conflict.
With the end of the cold war, the international community has become
much more willing to intervene in post-conflict situations, to help restore
political stability and help with economic reconstruction and with legal
reform as part of that. In particular, after the intervention in 1995 in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, even international financial institutions like the
World Bank became much more involved in post-conflict situations-not
just the U.N., as had been the case before. The reason that was the case
is because, as you can imagine-the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), their main mandate is economic issues-there
was a perceived problem with going beyond the competence or the mandate of the World Bank. I will touch on that again at the end of my talk.
You can imagine that there is an enormous challenge in how to conduct
post-conflict reconstruction because the legal infrastructure is in shambles, yet the economic situation is dire, and we are talking about basic
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infrastructure being completely destroyed. The main challenge is that the
conflict may resume. There have actually been studies that there is about
a 44 percent chance that, within five years of the onset of peace, conflict
will resume. So, that is what we are dealing with in post-conflict
reconstruction.
For that reason, post-conflict reconstruction demands extraordinary
measures that go well beyond what we have seen in normal redevelopment aid. It requires things like demobilizing and reintegrating combatants. It requires reform of the armed services and police forces-again,
reconstruction of basic infrastructure-and what I am going to touch on
today, some form of legal reckoning with past abuses. I will talk about
why that is important.
So the demands on reconstruction aid are overwhelming, as you can
tell, and it is not surprising that some perceive a tension there between
the different goals-for example, between demobilization and disarmament of combatants and economic need. To continue on with a specific
example, in Sierra Leone, the World Bank has actually been active in
helping with a project that helps demobilize and reintegrate former combatants, doing things like giving reinsertion benefits and helping provide
training. There has been a study showing that there is a growing resentment among many Sierra Leonians because they think that combatants
are receiving these reinsertion benefits of $150 and are getting additional
training, while the victims of the conflict-victims of sexual violence, mutilation, and internal displacement-say that they have not received sufficient support. They have received some support, but they say that
instead of giving this money to the combatants, it should go either to
economic development more generally or to the victims. So there is this
tension there, and a similar tension is often perceived between prosecutions of international crimes on the one hand, which are very complex
and require a lot of resources and, on the other hand, basic economic
needs-economic development-and this has been reported in many
post-conflict situations-Bosnia, Rwanda, East Timor, Sierra Leone.
I would like to talk about how we can address that tension, and I would
say two things are important. One is to think about how to design postconflict justice in a way that puts the least possible strain or less of a
strain on economic development. The other is that we need to understand and promote the ways in which post-conflict justice can have longterm benefits in terms of promoting legal reform or how it fits with more
general legal reform measures and then, in turn, how legal reform can
help economic development.
First, let me talk about the concern by many local populations that
post-conflict justice may be in tension with economic development or basic economic needs. As I already said, prosecutions of international
crimes, human rights abuses committed during the conflict or during a
dictatorship, are quite complex and require a lot of resources. Often the
international community actually insists that they be done according to
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certain human rights standards, and often they are high human rights
standards. So if you look at the paradigm of international prosecutions
that have occurred in the Yugoslavian and Rwandan tribunals, these are
incredibly expensive and also very slow processes.
Just to give you an example, the ICTR budget is $250 million for 20042005, and it has, since 2003, delivered five judgments and convicted five
people-incredibly expensive. Post-conflict countries simply cannot afford that kind of process, and just to give you an example, in Rwanda,
only about 20 percent of the judiciary survived the genocide, so we are
talking about a serious lack of qualified lawyers and qualified judges.
And yet, at the same time, they had hundreds of thousands of suspects in
detention and awaiting trial. So this is what they are dealing with. It is
understandable that ordinary Rwandan trials will cut down on procedural
protections, so they employ plea-bargaining a lot more, they rely on hearsay evidence a lot more, they do not provide defense attorneys for indigent defendants, they do not provide as much judicial review over
investigations, and so on and so forth. But they are much quicker-they
last about a day as opposed to months and years at the ICTR.
Rwanda has also turned to informal substitutes for the legal process, so
they have started the Gacaca courts, which are relying on traditional
mechanisms of resolving disputes where the community is very involved-local elders are the judges. Now these Gacaca courts have been
criticized by human rights NGOs (Non-governmental Organizations) as
not providing sufficient procedural protections. For example, the defendant is not allowed to have a defense attorney present in these Gacaca
proceedings. But I think we should look at them as useful complements
to regular rule of law measures. For one, they are cheaper, and also, as
Professor Garro was mentioning, they may be more consistent with the
local culture.
If we want something that will be longer lasting, we may have to think
about complements between informal traditional mechanisms and more
formal rule of law mechanisms and how to combine these. I do not think
that is giving up on the rule of law project or human rights. It is just a
recognition that implementation may take a long time-implementation
for formal rule of law. It is also recognition, again, of the importance of
culture in the process, and also that we may require some economic development to take hold before we can continue with full implementation
of rule of law measures.
My next point is whether post-conflict justice actually has longer-term
benefits, which would make it worthwhile pursuing despite some of its
short-term tensions with economic needs and economic development.
The first such long-term benefit is political stability-that post-conflict
trials of human rights abuses actually promote political stability. That is
because they replace private vengeance with trials, and, in that way, they
end a vicious cycle of violence and revenge, and, instead, we have a more
formal political mechanism of resolving disputes. And this is something
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that is actually believed by people in post-conflict situations. They do
believe that this is going to occur. There was a recent poll of Afghanis,
and about 76 percent of them believe that bringing war criminals to justice will increase stability and bring security.
Now, as we know, political stability is a pre-condition for economic
development, so you can see how that has long-term benefits. I would
suggest there is an even tighter link between post-conflict trials and economic development because putting on trial people in positions of privilege who abused that privilege to terrorize and control the population
also helps establish the rule of law, and it has an important symbolic significance in that way-that people who ruled with impunity and were
thought to be above the law are now subject to the law just like everyone
else. So it does have that important message about the meaning of what
is the rule of law-very clear message about what it means-about what
equality in a court of law means. So I would say, at a bare minimum,
post-conflict prosecutions help us restore the rule of law, and I want to
explain that.
Rule of law means very different things to different people. I want to
say that in post-conflict situations, it is better to think of a thin version of
the rule of law, which is mostly focusing on process-on predictability,
stability, equality before the law, consistent application, and impartial application-as opposed to a more substantive conception-a thicker conception of the rule of law, which may incorporate a certain conception of
human rights or liberal democracy. I think it is important to focus on the
thin conception of the rule of law because, at least for now, we do not
really have good evidence. There is evidence that rule of law promotes
economic development, but it seems that that is the thin conception of
the rule of law-predictability, stability, and impartial application. It is
not clear that we need to have a particular version of democracy, or a
particular liberal democracy, or a particular level of human rights in order
to promote economic development. On the other hand, there is evidence
that wealth and economic development do generate a demand for the
rule of law and a demand for higher protection of rights. So, you have to
think about it in a sequence that maybe we would start with a lower level
of rule of law, then we get some more development, and then that produces a greater demand for the rule of law and human rights.
Another way to promote the link between the rule of law and postconflict prosecutions is something that is becoming only recently better
recognized by people who are involved in these efforts in the field. So in
the past, we had people, NGOs, government donors, who would be helping with prosecutions, on the one hand, of human rights abuses, and then
there would be people who would be helping with legal reforms. The two
were not necessarily talking with each other even though the scholarship
recognized the link between the two. The two were not really talking to
each other within the field, but there are actual signs that this is changing,
and I think that is a good thing. There is greater recognition of the link

2006]

SESSION FOUR

between post-conflict justice and the rule of law and economic development, and there is greater communication between these two groups. For
example, war crimes tribunals like the special courts of Sierra Leone are
becoming more involved with outreach efforts to the general population,
involving the local legal community a lot more in their work, and, to the
extent that they have resources, also are somewhat involved in legal education and legal reform measures. Also, despite the fact that we now
have the International Criminal Court, donor governments and NGOs
are recognizing that the International Criminal Court will not have that
transformative effect on local systems in terms of promoting the rule of
law and also will not be able to handle all the cases that are going to arise.
So they sponsor things like the joint rapid response initiative that aims to
provide short-term assistance on short notice-technical assistance to
countries that are not quite able to prosecute and investigate war crimes
and human rights cases on their own. But, at the same time, we do not
want them to resort to the ICC as long as we can help those countries to
do it on their own. So there has been a lot more emphasis on, again,
helping domestic systems through these types of initiatives to jump start
the process and then to connect it to other long-term reform measures of
the kind that are supported by the World Bank. The World Bank has
been more and more involved in rule of law efforts-legal reform efforts.
I think that is a great development-as long as there is a greater integration with post-conflict justice measures, over the long run, post-conflict
justice need not be inconsistent with economic development.
Now, even though we have these long-term benefits, short-term tensions are likely to persist, and what I would like to suggest, as I said earlier, is that the way to address those short-term tensions is, on the one
hand, through creative and cost effective methods like the Gacaca tribunals that perhaps rely on less formal methods of dispute settlement. And
on the other hand, again, to involve the local community and make clear
what the longer term benefits of post-conflict justice may be. But it is
important to have that local ownership to insure that these measures are
sustainable.
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